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Why the UN Can’t End Wars
Séverine Autesserre 
In nearly 50 conflict zones around the world, some one and a half billion people live under the threat of violence. In many of these places, the primary enforcers of order are not police officers or 
government soldiers but the blue-helmeted troops of the United 
Nations. With more than 78,000 soldiers and 25,000 civilians scattered 
across 14 countries, un peacekeepers make up the second-largest mili-
tary force deployed abroad, after the U.S. military.
The ambition of their task is immense. From Haiti to Mali, from 
Kosovo to South Sudan, un peacekeepers are invited into war-torn 
countries and charged with maintaining peace and security. In most 
cases, that means nothing less than transforming states and societies. 
Peacekeepers set out to protect civilians, train police forces, disarm 
militias, monitor human rights abuses, organize elections, provide 
emergency relief, rebuild court systems, inspect prisons, and promote 
gender equality. And they attempt all of that in places where enduring 
chaos has defied easy solution; otherwise, they wouldn’t be there to 
begin with.
Unfortunately, this endeavor has a spotty track record. Global 
leaders continue to call on “the blue helmets” as the go-to solution 
whenever violence flares in the developing world. U.S. President 
Barack Obama praised un peacekeeping as “one of the world’s most 
important tools to address armed conflict,” and the un itself claims 
that it has “helped end conflicts and foster reconciliation by conduct-
ing successful peacekeeping operations in dozens of countries.” But 
in fact, un peacekeepers too often fail to meet their most basic objec-
tives. On many deployments, they end up watching helplessly while 
war rages. On others, they organize elections and declare victory, but 
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without having fixed the root causes that brought them there—making 
it all too likely that fighting will flare again before long.
Part of the reason for this failure is a lack of resources. It is hard to 
fault the un for that, since it relies on contributions from its members. 
The larger problem, however, is a fundamental misunderstanding 
about what makes for a sustained peace. The un’s strategy favors 
top-down deals struck with elites and fixates on elections. But that 
neglects what should be the other main component of their approach: 
embracing bottom-up strategies that draw on local knowledge and 
letting the people themselves determine how best to promote peace.
THE RISE OF THE BLUE HELMETS
When the un was created, in 1945, it was never intended to have its 
own fighting force; the un Charter makes no mention of peacekeeping. 
But it quickly became clear that some such capacity would be essential 
if the organization was to have any hope of meeting its simplest goals. 
In 1948, the un’s mediator in Palestine asked for a small group of un 
guards to monitor the truce between Israel and its Arab neighbors, 
an ad hoc mission that marked the birth of peacekeeping. Most deploy-
ments over the next few decades followed a similar pattern: at the 
invitation of the host government and with the agreement of all warring 
parties, the un would send in soldiers after a cease-fire or a peace 
settlement was reached, provided that no permanent member of the 
Security Council vetoed the idea.
The possibility of a veto meant that intervention was limited to places 
not caught up in the East-West rivalry, and as a result, peacekeeping 
missions were rare during the Cold War. Only 13 were set up between 
1948 and 1978, and none at all between 1979 and 1987. The missions 
that did exist were fairly unintrusive. A small number of unarmed 
observers would monitor cease-fire lines and troop withdrawals, as in 
Kashmir in 1949, or lightly armed soldiers would try to insert them-
selves between national armies, as in Lebanon in 1978. Sometimes, 
the presence of un soldiers helped prevent further conflict, while at 
other times, it did not. The 1973 Yom Kippur War embodied this 
mixed track record: un peacekeepers succeeded in enforcing the 
cease-fire along the Egyptian-Israeli border in the Sinai, but they 
failed to do the same at the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights. 
Even though the un peacekeeping forces were awarded the 1988 
Nobel Peace Prize, their global impact remained limited.
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The end of the Cold War heralded a new era. With U.S.-Soviet 
tensions no longer paralyzing the un, the organization would finally, 
its leaders thought, be able to do its job. And so in the span of roughly 
two years, from April 1991 to October 1993, it launched 15 new 
peacekeeping operations—more than it had in the first 40 years of 
its history. In many countries, the missions worked: in Namibia, 
El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, peacekeepers helped de-
crease violence by disarming combatants and brokering agreements. 
Owing to the sheer number of missions, peacekeeping became insti-
tutionalized. It acquired a dedicated department within the un and 
its own staff, budget, and standard operating procedures—all the 
bureaucratic trappings of a global priority. 
The optimism soon faded. First came the events in Somalia, where 
the un would send approximately 28,000 troops to monitor a cease-
fire in the country’s long-running civil war and provide humanitarian 
relief. In June 1993, two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers were killed by 
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militants there, and a few months later, in the “Black Hawk down” 
episode, so were 18 U.S. soldiers supporting the un mission. Then 
came the massacres in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995, 
when un peacekeepers stood by and watched as local armed groups 
perpetrated genocide.
Observers began to sour on peacekeeping. The people living where 
peacekeepers operated were not much kinder, portraying them as meek 
foreigners uninterested in their work. 
Salvadorans nicknamed the un mission 
in their country “Vacaciones Unidas” 
(United Vacations), Cypriots spoke of 
“beach keepers,” and Bosnians mocked 
the “Smurfs.” Yet because major powers 
preferred un operations to the type of 
full-scale interventions they had no 
interest in doing, the Security Council continued to generate missions 
at a fast pace—authorizing 16 of them between 1994 and 1998.
By 1999, the un realized it had to rethink its approach. That year, 
leaders in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo finally reached peace agreements and asked 
for the un’s help in implementing them. The organization’s secretary-
general, Kofi Annan, who had previously headed its peacekeeping 
department, wanted to prevent new failures, so he requested two 
major reviews of international intervention. The first resulted in the 
Brahimi report (named after the Algerian diplomat who led the 
initiative), which detailed reforms to make un peacekeeping more 
effective. The second produced the “responsibility to protect” doctrine: 
the idea that the so-called international community is morally obli-
gated to help people living in states that are unable or unwilling to 
protect their citizens from serious violations of human rights.
These reports, and the debates they launched, transformed the un’s 
approach to peacekeeping. No longer should peacekeepers merely 
monitor cease-fire lines passively. Instead, they should take a proactive 
stance, using military force to prevent combatants from perpetrating 
violence. To avoid another Rwanda or Bosnia, where overly restrictive 
rules of engagement had led to disaster, peacekeeping forces should 
have strong mandates and ample resources.
The result of these developments is that peacekeeping is now very 
different from what it was during the Cold War. Instead of trying to 
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end war primarily between states, peacekeepers now focus on main-
taining peace within states. Their duties have expanded to include a 
laundry lists of tasks, from reorganizing armies to protecting popula-
tions to arranging elections. The personnel have evolved accordingly. 
In addition to soldiers and military 
officers, un missions now hire experts 
on development, gender, politics, eco-
nomics, administration, justice, human 
rights, land-mine removal, elections, 
media, and communication. In postwar 
East Timor and Kosovo, the un even 
served as a de facto transitional gov-
ernment overseeing the new states’ functions. And of the 18 missions 
deployed since 2000, an increasing number have been given “enforce-
ment” mandates: instead of relying on the consent of all the warring 
parties to implement peace agreements and using their military might 
only in self-defense, un soldiers can employ lethal force to defeat 
combatants. In the Central African Republic, Congo, and Mali, un 
troops have ended up fighting rebel groups on the side of—or on 
behalf of—the government.
Despite all these supposed improvements, today, just like 20 years 
ago, peacekeepers often fail to meet the high expectations set for them. 
Experts all use different definitions of success and thus arrive at different 
conclusions, so whether or not a un mission can be considered a failure 
is a matter of interpretation. Some scholars have arrived at positive 
assessments. Michael Gilligan and Ernest Sergenti, for instance, have 
calculated that 85 percent of un operations have resulted in prolonged 
periods of peace or shortened periods of war. Page Fortna has deter-
mined that, all else being equal, the presence of peacekeepers decreases 
the risk of another war breaking out by 55–62 percent. Lisa Hultman, 
Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon have shown that the deployment 
of un troops reduces both battlefield deaths and civilian killings. Other 
scholars have come to more dispiriting conclusions. Jeremy Weinstein 
discovered that 75 percent of the civil wars in which the un intervened 
resumed within ten years of stopping. Michael Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambanis studied 138 peace processes and found that roughly half of 
those that had peacekeepers failed to decrease the violence or further 
democracy. Roland Paris analyzed 11 un missions in depth and found 
that only two were able to build a sustainable peace. 
Peacekeepers can’t hold  
the Security Council 
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What’s more, missions that are celebrated as successful on the 
national and international levels do not necessarily improve condi-
tions on the ground. In a study of Liberia, Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus 
Samii showed that, despite some positive outcomes, peacekeeping 
deployments at the municipal level did not promote security or help 
restore local authority. 
Finally, even the success stories tend to fall apart on closer inspec-
tion. The mission in Cyprus, which began in 1964, is often heralded 
for having reduced fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but 
it can hardly be called a triumph. The island is divided in two, and 
political reunification looks almost as distant as it did 50 years ago. 
The 2004–6 operation in Burundi used to be the poster child for un 
peacekeeping, credited with tamping down violence after years of 
civil war and helping the country transition to democracy. A decade 
later, however, Burundi is back to dictatorship and war. The bottom 
line is that un missions do help, at times, to some extent, but they 
could do far better.
PEACEKEEPING ON THE CHEAP
The un’s defenders rightly point out that peacekeepers have one of 
the hardest jobs in the world. They operate in places rife with ruthless 
militias, abusive armies, corrupt officials, and shabby infrastructure. 
Instructions from the Security Council to support the host govern-
ment further complicate their task, since rebels are less inclined to 
cooperate when they believe that the un is aiding the enemy. More-
over, since great powers tend to care little about the crises the un is 
sent to address, peacekeepers are given precious few resources with 
which to accomplish their ambitious mandates. At $7 billion annu-
ally, the un peacekeeping budget may seem impressive. But it equals 
less than 0.5 percent of global military spending, and with it, the 
organization is expected to help resolve more than a quarter of all 
ongoing wars.
The main consequence is too few people on the ground, which 
makes it difficult for the un to even scratch the surface of its mandates. 
In Congo, for example, the un mission’s gender office in the province 
of North Kivu—where sexual violence is pervasive—was staffed by 
one lone un volunteer for years. Meanwhile, the number of un soldiers 
is usually paltry given the size of the territories they’re supposed to 
monitor or pacify. There is roughly one peacekeeper per 400 square 
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miles in Western Sahara, one per 50 square miles in Congo, and one 
per 30 square miles in South Sudan. Compare that to the peak of the 
U.S. war in Afghanistan, when there was one foreign soldier per two 
square miles, or to the United States itself, where there is one law 
enforcement officer per four square miles.
Since the un does not have its own pool of soldiers, it must rely on 
the goodwill of its member states to provide them. Countries are 
reluctant to risk the lives of their troops in conflicts in which they have 
no stake, and so it often takes months for the un to muster the forces 
it needs. When it finally does, it almost always ends up with poorly 
trained and poorly paid soldiers from developing countries. (In 2018, 
the top troop contributors to the un were Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and 
Rwanda.) These troops are often poorly equipped, too—forced to get 
by without helicopters and to make do with outdated vehicles. 
To make matters worse, their commanders report not just to the un 
leadership but also to their own country’s chain of command. These 
officers know what their countries expect from them: to bring their 
troops back home safe. When they have to choose between fulfilling 
the un mandate and avoiding casualties, they generally choose the 
latter. That is what happened in Srebrenica in 1995, when the Dutch 
commander of a peacekeeping battalion, outnumbered and outgunned, 
had his soldiers stand by as Serbian forces rounded up and killed some 
8,000 Muslim men and boys.
Worst of all, some peacekeepers harm those they are meant to 
help. In the Central African Republic, Congo, and Somalia, they 
have engaged in torture. In Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo, they have 
been implicated in sex-trafficking rings. In fact, over the past 12 
years, the un has received nearly 1,000 allegations of sexual abuse 
and exploitation by peacekeepers. Those who commit such horrible 
acts are a minority, but the bad apples have done grave harm to 
the un’s reputation. 
THE WRONG STRATEGY
Both the peacekeeping leadership in New York and the rank and file in 
the field tend to blame all these woes on the Security Council, which 
provides neither adequate resources nor clear mandates. To ensure 
success, they say, peacekeepers need more money, more logistical sup-
port, and more people, along with more realistic instructions. And, 
they add, the Security Council needs to force countries that contribute 
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troops to stop interfering with the operations on the ground and 
instead tell their officers to respect the un chain of command. But 
peacekeepers can’t hold the Security Council responsible for all their 
shortcomings. Because they are the product of compromise, mandates 
are always vague, and they always need to be interpreted. Besides, 
even when powerful states and troop-contributing countries devote 
ample resources to a un mission, the resulting efforts often fail.
The problem is bigger than mandates and resources. Above all, 
it has to do with two strategic choices the un frequently makes: first, 
to work with national elites to stop 
violence from the top down and, second, 
to push for quick elections as a way to 
consolidate the peace. The standard 
un approach to ending wars is to host 
large, costly conferences in order to 
strike agreements between governments and rebel leaders and then 
organize a national vote and declare victory. Both tendencies are 
based on faulty assumptions.
The weakness of the top-down approach is that warfare is often 
the result of not just national or international competition but local 
competition, too. In many conflict zones, the fight is over such issues 
as land, water, livestock, and low-level traditional and administrative 
power. In South Sudan, for example, it is not only tensions between 
President Salva Kiir and the former vice president and now rebel 
leader Riek Machar that fuel the current fighting; it is also clan rival-
ries and countless spats between herders and farmers.
When it comes to the un’s fixation on elections, the problem is that 
pushing for a vote before a country is ready may do more harm than 
good. In Angola in 1992, a premature vote triggered a resumption of 
fighting between the ruling party and the main rebel group (resulting 
in more deaths in two years than there were in the 17-year war that the 
un had supposedly ended).
Both of these errors are on full display today in Congo, the site of 
both the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II and the largest 
peacekeeping mission in the world. The un attributes strife there to 
national and international factors: a weak central government, tensions 
between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his opponents, and 
disputes with neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. It views elections, 
which Kabila has delayed for years, as a sort of cure-all. In fact, much 
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of the violence in Congo is local in origin. Disputes often center on 
who will control neighboring land, the exploitation of local mining 
sites, or the traditional or administrative power over a village or a 
district. These tensions often result in localized fighting in one village 
or territory but frequently escalate into generalized conflict across a 
whole province and even at times spill over into neighboring countries.
Compounding these mistakes is the un’s overriding disdain for 
all things local. Because subject-area experience is valued more 
than country expertise, management positions almost always go to 
foreigners, who usually have no in-depth knowledge of their host 
societies, cultures, or institutions. Often, staff lack the language 
skills to communicate with local people—or even, at times, with one 
another. In the mission in Cyprus, for example, few peacekeepers 
speak Greek or Turkish; the same is true for Arabic or Nuer in South 
Sudan, Albanian or Serbo-Croatian in Kosovo, and French or Haitian 
Creole in Haiti.
Peacekeepers’ everyday behavior only adds to the problem. Both the 
un’s military personnel and its civilian personnel live in fortified 
compounds and gather information mainly from elites. Sometimes, 
the result is that they thoughtlessly apply universal templates. For 
example, on seeing the success of so-called disarmament, demobili-
zation, and reintegration programs in Burundi and Sierra Leone, 
the un attempted similar initiatives in Haiti and South Sudan, where 
conditions were different; the efforts failed. At other times, dangerous 
groupthink takes hold. In Congo, for instance, between the last two 
rounds of elections, from 2006 to 2011, most peacekeepers held a 
simplistic view of the primary cause of the violence (the illegal exploi-
tation of mineral resources), the main consequence (sexual abuse 
of women and girls), and the best solution (a stronger state). By 
empowering the Congolese government and its army, the strategy 
that emerged from this view actually led to an uptick in human rights 
violations, including sexual abuse.
The preponderance of foreign staff and foreign ideas also generates 
resentment among local partners. In country after country, residents 
complain that peacekeepers are arrogant and demeaning, live in lavish 
accommodations, drive fancy suvs, and spend far too much time relax-
ing and far too little actually doing their jobs. They regularly disparage 
peacekeepers as neocolonial; local media portray them as parasites 
at best and thugs at worst. Fair or unfair, these views often cause local 
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people to refuse to cooperate with un initiatives, even when they 
support the underlying goals. 
In recent years, insiders and outsiders have attempted to change the 
standard un approach. Certain low-level staff and high-ranking leaders 
within field missions have tried to promote local conflict resolution. 
A 2015 independent review of peacekeeping, commissioned by the 
un, emphasized the importance of customizing projects to each con-
text and interacting with everyday people. Apart from a few marginal 
cases, however, the un is largely paying lip service to the importance 
of these ideas instead of actually implementing them. 
THINK LOCALLY, ACT LOCALLY
Peacekeeping is broken, but that doesn’t mean the world should give 
up on it. In many conflict zones, peacekeepers are the only ones 
protecting populations against abuse by national armies and rebel 
groups—even if sporadically and imperfectly. (In the Central African 
Republic and Congo, people have protested or rioted at the mere 
hint that the un might close a nearby base.) What’s more, there’s no 
alternative body or mechanism for reestablishing peace in conflict-
ridden countries. The goal should be not to eliminate peacekeeping 
but to rethink it.
The main problem is that the un looks at its efforts backward. It 
has a cookie-cutter approach that begins with international best 
practices and tries to apply them to a local situation. Instead, it should 
start with local realities and then create a customized strategy. For 
inspiration, the un need only look to the pockets of peace that already 
exist in many war-torn places. 
Consider the island of Idjwi, in Lake Kivu in eastern Congo. 
Since war broke out in Congo in 1996, a conflict that has killed any-
where from two million to five million people, Idjwi has avoided the 
brunt of the violence, even as other islands in nearby lakes have not. 
Idjwi has all the same factors that have fueled fighting around it: a 
geostrategic location, mineral resources, ethnic tensions, a lack of 
state authority, extreme poverty, disputes over land and traditional 
power. But the island’s residents, including the poorest and least 
powerful, have set up various grass-roots organizations—religious 
networks, women’s associations, youth groups, and so on—to help 
resolve disputes. They also draw on strong traditional beliefs—for 
example, forming blood pacts through which different families 
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promise never to hurt one another. They have worked to foster 
what they call a “culture of peace.”
There are similar examples: The inhabitants of the autonomous 
region of Somaliland, in war-torn Somalia, have reduced violence 
through a twin process of bottom-up peace building and state 
building and by relying on ordinary people and local leaders to 
help maintain their hard-won stability. In Colombia, residents of 
the rural community of San José de Apartadó have created a zone 
of peace in the middle of a region controlled by militias. Contrary to 
the un’s standard procedures, building peace doesn’t require billions 
of dollars in aid or massive international interventions. It often 
involves empowering average citizens.
The un currently views such bottom-up peace-building efforts as 
a sideshow. Instead, it should see them as an essential complement to 
its current top-down efforts to stop fighting. In practice, this means 
acknowledging that resolving local disputes is just as important—and 
just as much a part of peacekeepers’ job—as addressing broader issues. 
It also means devoting money to local conflict resolution. Both at 
headquarters and on the ground, the un should create specialized 
offices or departments for bottom-up peacemaking and staff them 
with experts in the analysis and resolution of grass-roots conflicts. 
This new staff, in turn, should produce guidelines and organize train-
ing for their colleagues. The Security Council should also mandate 
that all missions support bottom-up peace building financially and 
logistically. And the un leadership should emphasize to all staff 
members that doing so within their own areas of expertise, whether 
that be elections or gender, is mandatory.
As peacekeepers seek to bolster local peace efforts, they must resist 
the temptation to impose universal approaches. They can take their 
cues from the Life and Peace Institute, a Swedish peace-building 
agency that grounds its actions in in-depth local expertise. In Congo, 
it relies heavily on local employees and does not implement projects 
directly, instead working with a few handpicked on-the-ground organi-
zations. These organizations then empower ordinary citizens to come 
to their own conclusions about the causes of their communities’ con-
flicts, agree on the right solutions, and put them into practice. It’s 
not foreigners based in capitals and headquarters who conceive, 
design, and implement peace initiatives; it’s the intended beneficiaries 
themselves, with an assist from outside organizations.
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For the un, this model would mean stepping up efforts to recruit 
staff who have an in-depth understanding of local contexts and a 
command of local languages, even as it continues to hire people with 
subject-specific expertise, as well. When considering retention and 
promotion, it should value time spent in a given area more than the 
number of missions completed in dif-
ferent countries. And it should give 
preference to nationals over foreigners 
when filling posts for a given mission 
(and among nationals, it should give 
preference to those who come from the 
specific area where they will be work-
ing). Foreigners should be hired only 
for positions for which no local person 
with the necessary skills can be found or for those in which outsider 
status is an asset—for example, a recruiting post in which a local 
employee would face inordinate pressure to hire friends or family, a 
political job in which a local staff member might worry about retribu-
tion when standing up to a warlord, or a position in which contribut-
ing ideas from elsewhere is key. Even if the un paid its local recruits 
a salary equivalent to that of its foreign staff, as it should, this mea-
sure would still save the organization money, since it currently spends 
a great deal on extras for foreigners, such as insurance premiums and 
hardship allowances.
The un should also rethink how it uses local hires. As things stand 
now, foreigners tend to make decisions, while local staff execute them. 
Although this makes sense for diplomatic missions seeking to uphold 
their countries’ interests, it is a bad idea for an international organiza-
tion whose main mandate is to promote peace. The prevailing practice 
should be inverted: local people should be in the driver’s seat, and 
foreigners should remain in the back. Instead of imposing or strongly 
advocating one idea, peacekeepers should use their technical expertise 
in a different way: to suggest several options, explain the pros and cons 
of each, and offer support—financial, logistical, military, and technical—
in implementing whichever plans the local stakeholders agree on.
Letting the intended beneficiaries of international intervention 
decide is all the more important when there are hard choices to make 
between two worthy goals—for instance, between democracy and peace 
or between peace and justice. In the current setup, foreign peacekeepers 
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and diplomats, rather than ordinary citizens, are typically the ones 
who choose between these goals. Far better to let those who have to 
live with the consequences of a decision be the ones making it. For 
example, in places where a focus on elections would come at the 
expense of addressing other pressing sources of conflict (such as 
poverty), the un should recognize the tradeoff. If the demand truly 
exists for elections, they can be set up quickly, with the understanding 
that the risk of violence may grow. But if people seem to care more 
about solving other problems, then the un should put democracy 
on the back burner and apply its scarce resources toward solving 
those underlying causes of war.
A BETTER WAY
The consequences of conflict rarely stay within national borders. 
What initially looks like contained fighting can quickly destabilize 
vital regions, and war creates a breeding ground for terrorists and illicit 
traffickers. In just the past five years, armed conflicts have spawned 
the worst refugee crisis since World War II. Partially in response to all 
these events, hateful nationalist political movements have surged in 
the United States and Europe.
In many cases, calling on the blue helmets has become merely a 
convenient substitute for a serious grappling with what it would take 
to bring peace. The same story thus repeats itself, whether in Bosnia, 
Congo, East Timor, Kosovo, Rwanda, Somalia, or South Sudan. After 
the outbreak of war, donor countries pledge millions of dollars in aid 
and ask the un for help. Eventually, the warring parties call for cease-
fires, sign agreements, and hold elections. But soon, sometimes just 
days later, violence flares up again. Often, it has never actually ended; 
in many cases, it lasts for years.
The international community’s preferred strategy for dealing with 
conflict simply isn’t working: peacekeeping as currently practiced is 
a Band-Aid on a gaping wound. The good news is that there is a way 
to rethink the current strategy so that it has a better shot at establish-
ing lasting peace: rely more on the very people it is ostensibly trying 
to protect.∂
